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HAVING ONE OAR OR BEING WITHOUT A





W HEN legal advocates for the poor gathered at Fordham Law
School in late 1998 to discuss ethical and professionalism issues
in the delivery of legal services to low-income clients, one of our tasks
was to make recommendations regarding the delivery of limited legal
assistance.' Participants in the Working Group on Limited Legal
Assistance included legal services program directors, Legal Services
Corporation staff, clinical law teachers (who were legal services law-
yers), representatives of the American Bar Association ("ABA"), the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association ("NLADA"), funding
organizations, and others involved in the delivery of legal services.
We came together with certain predispositions on this issue,
although they were not always explicit. Some acknowledged that they
had been providing limited legal assistance for years but had never
confronted the ethical issues raised by the practice. Others are strong
proponents of limited legal assistance as a means to provide increased
access to legal services for both low-income and moderate-income cli-
ents. At least one, myself, came vith a predisposition against limited
legal assistance, fearing that it results in poor quality legal services for
*Thanks to Group member John Asher for suggesting this analogy.
** Clinic Director and Associate Professor, University of Montana School of
Law. Special thanks to Kelli Sather for her able research assistance, to Wendy Owens
for her efficient word processing assistance, and to Justine Dunlap, Katherine Hessler,
Kathleen Magone, Maylinn Smith, Carl Tobias, and Paul Tremblay, who read earlier
drafts of these comments.
1. To the extent the positions adopted here vary from those in a previous analysis
of ethical issues in the context of unbundling, Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attor-
ney-Client Roles: Unbundling and Moderate-Income Elderly Clients, 32 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 295 (1997), these ideas represent a recognition of the very limited resources
for low-income clients and an acknowledgment that limited legal assistance models
are increasingly the predominant method of delivering legal services to the poor. In
light of these facts, it seems prudent to contribute to the debate about how these
services are delivered.
Although the Working Group on Limited Legal Assistance did not define -limited
legal assistance," also called unbundling or discrete task assistance, it is generally un-
derstood to be legal assistance that includes only selected tasks from the full range of
lawyering provided in the traditional attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., Forrest S.
Mosten, Unbundling of Legal Services & the Family Lawyer, 28 Fam. LQ. 421, 423
(1994) ("Unbundling these various services means that the client can be in charge of
selecting from lawyers' services only a portion of the full package and contracting
with the lawyer accordingly.").
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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
low-income people, is potentially detrimental to clients, and perpetu-
ates dual systems of justice.2
Despite these varying perspectives, the group was committed to
grappling with the unfortunate reality of legal services to the poor: a
tremendous scarcity of resources.' We struggled to define mecha-
nisms to increase legal access for low-income people without so dilut-
ing legal services as to render them meaningless, and simultaneously
to respect client autonomy. As suggested by one Group member,
although limited legal assistance may be sending clients out in a boat
with only one oar, isn't that better than leaving them without a boat?
Or, isn't half a lawyer better than no lawyer?
The Group ultimately concluded that half was better than none, and
sought to devise a system for providing these services that offered suf-
ficient client protections. The centerpiece of the resulting recommen-
dations is the division of limited legal assistance services into two
categories, "brief, specific advice" and those services requiring a diag-
nostic interview, and a reinterpretation of select ethical principles in
the brief advice setting.4
The Fordham recommendations on limited legal assistance' un-
doubtedly are, and will be, controversial. Hopefully, they also are a
concrete step in identifying client-centered mechanisms for increasing
access to justice in a world of limited resources.
This Essay seeks to do what the Group wanted, but had insufficient
time, to do: to apply the recommendations to a variety of delivery
models and evaluate the consequences of these suggestions. This ini-
tial effort to apply the recommendations is a critical step in evaluating
their merits. It is not intended to be a thorough analysis of the ethical
issues implicated by the recommendations, which would be valuable,
nor is it a critique of the value of limited legal assistance-an impor-
tant and healthy debate. Rather, my purpose is narrow. I ask two
simple questions: (1) If a lawyer or legal services provider imple-
mented these recommendations, what would it mean for her practice?
(2) In light of this application of the recommendations, what are their
strengths and weaknesses?6 Following this analysis, I suggest an alter-
2. This position was explicit. See McNeal, supra note 1, at 296 (defining discrete
task representation, or unbundling, as "the process of breaking down legal problems
or issues into their components, enabling clients to choose selected aspects of the
problem for a lawyer's representation, assistance, or advice" (citation omitted)).
3. See, e.g., Paul R. Tremblay, Acting "A Very Moral Type of God". Triage
Among Poor Clients, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2475, 2479-84 (1999) (outlining the history
of funding for legal services for the poor and the chronic problem of scarcity).
4. See Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to
Low-Income Persons, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1751, Recommendation 60(a), at 1776
(1999) [hereinafter Recommendations].
5. Id. Recommendations 47-64, at 1774-78.
6. My thinking about limited legal assistance was enhanced dramatically by the
discussions in this Group while at the Fordham conference, and I am grateful to the
conference sponsors for bringing together such a knowledgeable and dedicated group
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native way to think about limited legal assistance and to evaluate its
role in the delivery of legal services.
Part I of this Essay outlines the Fordham recommendations regard-
ing limited legal assistance. Part II applies the recommendations to
various delivery models, including pro se clinics, hotlines, form plead-
ings, and ghostwriting, noting that the recommendations turn on the
distinction between "brief, specific advice" and services requiring a
diagnostic interview, not the particular delivery model. This applica-
tion illustrates the strengths of the recommendations, which include
the dual categories of limited legal assistance, the critical role of the
diagnostic interview, and the flexibility of the contextual interpreta-
tion of the ethical rules. It also highlights a weakness, i.e., the diffi-
culty in determining into which category of limited legal assistance a
particular inquiry falls. Part III proposes a different conceptual model
for evaluating the role of limited legal assistance in the delivery of
legal services. Part IV outlines a research agenda. These reflections
conclude in part IV by arguing for a tentative application of the rec-
ommendations coupled with extensive assessment of their effects on
clients' efforts to obtain justice.
I. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON LIMITED
LEGAL ASSISTANCE
The Group outlined a series of principles applicable to limited legal
assistance. They include the following: (1) There should be ongoing
analysis of the purpose of law and legal proceedings to simplify the
administration of justice and to serve the interests of the public;7 (2)
Rules governing the practice of law should not be interpreted to nar-
row the delivery of services;' and (3) The Model Rules should be in-
terpreted to encourage the use and expansion of delivery modes that
increase access. 9
Relying on these and other principles, the Group adopted specific
recommendations for limited legal assistance. Defining legal assist-
ance as existing on a continuum, with "general advice" on one end,
and traditional, full-service representation on the other, the Group
sought to define those categories of legal assistance in the middle. In
Recommendation Sixty, the Group divided limited legal assistance
into two categories: (1) "brief, specific advice"; and (2) assistance re-
of advocates. The positions articulated here represent my interpretation of the Rec-
ommendations, and not necessarily those of the Group, unless otherwise stated. At
the request of our facilitator, Lynn Kelly, I prepared the summary of our Group dis-
cussions and revisions to the recommendations in light of the final conference session.
Throughout the process of preparing these documents, I was cognizant of my multiple
roles and hope I fairly differentiated the ideas of the Group from my own when they
differed.
7. See Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 47, at 1774.
8. See id Recommendation 48, at 1774.
9. See id- Recommendation 51, at 1775.
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quiring a diagnostic interview. 10 "Brief, specific advice" is defined as
"answering a specific question or limited set of related questions with-
out follow up or exploration by the legal services provider."" In all
other circumstances, a diagnostic interview is required to determine
which limited legal assistance methodologies are appropriate for this
particular consumer.
The recommendations further provide that systems of limited legal
assistance must be evaluated. 2 The recommendations also emphasize
the court's role in increasing access to justice and that the courts and
the legal profession should "explore innovative efforts to assist pro se
10. Recommendation 60 states as follows:
Within the Limited Legal Assistance category, there are two subdivisions:
(a) brief, specific advice, and (b) assistance requiring a diagnostic interview.
(a) Brief, Specific Advice: An individual may interact with a lawyer or legal
services organization for the limited purpose of obtaining brief, specific
advice. "Brief, specific advice" shall be defined as answering a specific
question or limited set of related questions without follow up or explora-
tion by the legal services provider. In such circumstances, the client
must be advised that the service is limited to brief advice only.
The lawyer or legal services provider offering brief advice is bound by
obligations of confidentiality, competence, and the duty to avoid con-
flicts of interest appropriate to the context. The lawyer or legal services
program has no duty to provide complete assistance with respect to the
individual's legal problem. Under the ethical rules governing conflicts of
interest which apply to potential as well as actual conflicts, the lawyer or
legal services program should not be restricted to the same degree as the
lawyer who renders more extensive representation. A lawyer or legal
services organization that provides brief advice must develop systems
that prevent disclosure of client confidences and must avoid the risk of
divided loyalty by terminating the communication as soon as it appears
that there may be a conflict with a previous recipient of brief advice
services. A provider of a brief service that also operates a full service or
diagnostic system must have in place a mechanism to avoid actual con-
flicts of interest between recipients of brief advice and those who receive
assistance under the full services or diagnostic models.
(b) Assistance Requiring a Diagnostic Interview: In all other circumstances,
the lawyer or legal services provider shall conduct a diagnostic interview
before providing legal assistance. That diagnostic process shall elicit suf-
ficient facts to enable an appropriate decision as to the limited service(s)
to offer the client and for the client to make an informed decision about
how to proceed. An informed decision includes knowledge of the cir-
cumstances under which the recommended course of action might
change and when additional services might be necessary. Information
obtained in this process is protected as confidential regardless of
whether an attorney-client relationship results from the process. When
the limited services identified through an appropriate diagnostic process
have been competently provided, the lawyer or legal services program
has no further obligation with respect to this client.
Id. Recommendation 60, at 1776-77.
11. Id. Recommendation 60(a), at 1776.
12. See id. Recommendations 57, 61, at 1775, 1777.
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litigants."13 Finally, the recommendations address the application of
selected ethical principles to these two settings. 14
II. APPLICATION OF RECOMMENDATION SIXTY TO
DELIVERY MODELS
A. Introduction
This part applies Recommendation Sixty to various delivery mod-
els. Since the recommendation's analysis hinges on whether or not
the service is "brief, specific advice," clarifying what services fall into
this category is helpful. Two examples of "brief, specific advice" are
provided in the recommendations themselves, and both present dis-
crete legal questions. The first is as follows: "[A] [p]otential client
calls [a] legal services office and states, 'My boyfriend registered his
car in my name because he had so many parking tickets. Now, he has
more parking tickets under my name. Do I have to pay them?"" 5
Her responsibility to pay tickets for a car registered in her name is
indisputable.' 6 The second example is as follows:
[A] [c]onsumer calls a legal services office and states that she was
turned down for credit and that her credit report is incorrect, and
asks what she should do. [A] [l]egal worker advises her how to get a
copy of her credit report, that the report is free, and the steps she
should take to get the credit reporting agency to revise the
information. 7
These examples are best understood in contrast to a question not
fitting the "brief, specific advice" category. A legal consumer may
raise the following question: "My boss was harassing me, so I quit my
job. Can I collect unemployment?" To give accurate advice in re-
13. Id. Recommendation 62, at 1777.
14. The Group's recommendations on limited legal assistance are consistent with
four major trends that emerged from the conference recommendations as a whole.
The first is an emphasis on innovation, especially technology, and modifying, or at
least reinterpreting, existing ethical norms, professional standards, and court practices
to encourage expanded use of technology. See id. Recommendations 47-51, 89-90, at
1774-75, 1786-87. Second, the role of courts and judges in expanding access to the
legal system is emphasized. See id. Recommendations 25-33, 62, at 1759-65, 1777-78.
Third, an expanded role for nonlawyer professionals is advocated to increase access to
the legal system. See id. Recommendations 25-33, at 1759-65. Fourth, many recom-
mendations emphasize the need for ongoing assessment and evaluation of delivery
models. See id. Recommendations 57, 119-40 at 1775, 1796-1800.
15. Id. Recommendation 60(a)(i), at 1776.
16. One could argue that there are follow-up questions, the answers to which are
more complicated. For example, the legal consumer could then ask what she can do
to get her boyfriend to reimburse her for the costs of the tickets. Answering this
question is more involved and could take this problem out of the -brief. specific ad-
vice" category.
17. Id. Recommendation 60(a)(ii), at 1776.
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sponse to this question, the legal professional 8 would need to engage
the caller in a fairly lengthy discussion about the surrounding facts,
including the nature of the harassment, what motivated it, how the
consumer responded, and whether she complained to her supervisor.
Consequently, this service would not be characterized as "brief, spe-
cific advice."
The determining factor in distinguishing between the two categories
is whether the legal professional can provide accurate, helpful assist-
ance based only upon minimal facts offered by the client. Although
this distinction is the crux of the recommendations, it does not lend
itself to easy definition. 19
B. Taxonomy of Limited Legal Assistance Delivery Models
Before applying the recommendations, it is helpful to identify a tax-
onomy of selected limited legal assistance delivery models. Returning
to the continuum and eliminating the extreme forms of "general ad-
vice" and "traditional, full service representation," delivery models in
the middle include "advice only,"20 pro se classes, form pleadings,
"ghostwriting," hotlines, and discrete-task representation.2'
"Advice only" may be provided in several contexts. The most com-
mon model is a legal consumer who contacts a legal services office and
asks a very discrete question. Typically, the consumer is not seeking
representation, but minimal assistance to help with a distinct legal is-
sue. The same type of inquiry might arise in the context of a pro bono
clinic being held at a local homeless shelter.
Pro se clinics, a second delivery model, vary considerably in format
and scope.22 Some clinics offer statements indicating the general na-
ture of the information provided, that legal advice will not be pro-
vided, or that participants will need to adapt information to their own
18. I use the term "legal professional" to include an attorney, paralegal, intake
worker, or other staff.
19. The difficulty in defining this distinction presents one of the weaknesses in the
approach adopted in the recommendations. See infra Part V.
20. In these comments, I use the term "advice only" to describe a delivery model.
This is to be distinguished from "brief, specific advice," one of the two categories of
limited legal assistance described in the Conference's recommendations. See Recom-
mendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 60, at 1776-77.
21. For a definition of discrete task assistance, see supra note 1.
22. For a definition of pro se clinics, see Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice:
Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and
Should Law School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1879, 1883 (1999)
(describing pro se clinics as "provid[ing] general information about the law, proce-
dure, and practice to a group of litigants or prospective litigants who share a common
category of legal issues"). See also Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The
Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU J. Pub. L. 123, 139-40 (1993) (finding a broad array of
approaches to pro se clinics from sample forms and cursory explanations to assistance
and follow-up through the hearing stage).
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situations and perhaps seek further help.3 Many clinics provide no
case-specific advice. In others, the degree of case-specific advice of-
fered is minimal, and usually provided only with the proviso that it is
"based solely on the limited information provided and might be signif-
icantly different after an in-depth interview. ' 24 In addition to legal
information2 provided orally or in writing, some clinics may also pro-
vide forms, which consumers may complete with the general assist-
ance of clinic staff or independently at a later date. Once the
consumer has finished the class, she is typically on her own to com-
plete the remaining tasks and hopefully to resolve her legal problems.
Another form of limited legal assistance is "form pleadings," where
documents are provided to the consumer to complete and file on her
own.z6 Examples of these documents include petitions for divorce,
counterclaims in eviction matters, and bankruptcy forms. Such plead-
ings or forms might be provided in the context of a pro se clinic or
independently distributed through the mail, a community education
program, or on-line.2 7
Ghostwriting is the process of preparing pleadings for a client, who
then files them pro se and represents herself. - In a series of recent
decisions, courts have frowned upon this process.2 9 At least one court
23. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 22, at 1891-94 (discussing efforts by the Maricopa
County Superior Court to assist pro se litigants).
24. Id. at 1889 (citation omitted).
25. For a discussion of the dubious distinctions between providing legal informa-
tion and legal advice, see, for example, 80 Op. Md Att'y Gen. No. 95-056 (1995) (out-
lining what services lay advocates may and may not provide to domestic violence
victims), available in 1995 WL 783587; Barry supra note 22, at 1892 (discussing the
appropriate function of a paralegal in the providing of legal services); Russell Engler,
And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the
Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1987, 1992-98 (1999) (exploring
the difficulties encountered by court clerks when asked for legal advice); Michael Mil-
lemann et al., Rethinking the Full-Service Legal Representational Model: A Maryland
Experiment, 30 Clearinghouse Rev. 1178, 1186-89 (1997) (arguing that trained
nonlawyers should be permitted to provide simple legal advice given the practical
difficulties of distinguishing between legal information and legal advice).
26. Form documents may also be provided by court personnel and other non-law-
yer professionals. See generally Jona Goldschmidt et al., Meeting the Challenge of
Pro Se Litigation: A Report and Guidebook for Judges and Court Managers 34-45
(1997) (discussing the use of forms in these contexts).
27. See id at 69.
28. For a more detailed discussion of ghostwriting, see generally John C.
Rothermich, Note, Ethical and Procedural Implications of "Ghosnivriting" for Pro Se
Litigants: Toward Increased Access to Civil Justice, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2687 (1999).
29. See, e.g., Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F.
Supp. 1075, 1079-80 (E.D. Va. 1997) (disapproving of ghostwriting as disrupting the
efficient administration of justice); Johnson v. Board of County Comm'r, 868 F. Supp.
1226 (D. Colo. 1994) (finding ghostwriting a violation of Fed R. Civ. P. 11), affd, 85
F.3d 489 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 884,
887 (D. Kan. 1997) (requiring plaintiff to identify if she had legal assistance in draft-
ing court documents, and noting that such attorney should be identified, enter an
appearance, and "accept accountability" for her work).
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has stated that the pro se litigant "cannot have it both ways," i.e., have
the added protection afforded pro se litigants and the advice and
assistance of counsel.30 A secondary concern is that such pleadings
are not signed by counsel, certifying that the claim is meritorious, and
therefore, the attorney is not subject to Rule 11 or other sanctions.3'
The hotline is one of the most prevalent limited legal assistance
methodologies. 32  Although various hotline systems exist, hotlines
usually include a central number, phones staffed by lawyers or parale-
gals, and a complex computer database. Following an initial tele-
phone interview, hotline staff provide information and/or advice to
the caller. Some programs provide additional services such as refer-
rals, letters or phone calls, document review, and written legal
opinions.33
In applying the recommendations to hotlines, the first inquiry is
whether or not this is a "brief, specific advice" service or a diagnostic
interview service, which will depend on the circumstances. The caller
is receiving "brief, specific advice" if she asks a single, or small
number, of well-defined questions that the hotline staff believes does
not require further exploration or follow-up questions. In that con-
text, the staff person need not conduct the diagnostic interview. The
staff person would, however, be required to advise the caller that this
is "brief, specific advice" service. If the caller asks multiple additional
questions or it becomes apparent to the staff person that the caller's
request is more complex than what can be accommodated by brief
advice, a diagnostic interview is required by Recommendation 60(b).3"
Each of the delivery models outlined above is a form of discrete
task assistance.35 Discrete task assistance also includes any limited
assistance that a lawyer and client agree shall be provided. For exam-
ple, a lawyer may assist a client in determining the tax consequences
of a property settlement in a divorce, or may help a client identify
zoning issues relevant to a proposed land purchase. This concept has
become increasingly common in the realm of personal service lawyer-
30. See Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1078.
31. See id. at 1078-79. Although devising a solution to this dilemma is beyond the
scope of this Essay, a potential compromise would be for the lawyer assisting pro se
litigants to identify herself for the court and to certify that these pleadings are accu-
rate based upon the information provided.
32. See generally Legal Counsel for the Elderly, Inc., American Ass'n of Retired
Persons, Legal Hotlines: A How To Manual (n.d.) [hereinafter Hotlines] (outlining
procedures for establishing various legal hotlines); see also Wayne Moore & Monica
Kolasa, AARP's Legal Services Network: Expanding Legal Services to the Middle
Class, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 503, 526 (1997) (describing a legal hotline program
pioneered by the American Association of Retired Persons in 1985).
33. See Hotlines, supra note 31, at 3-5.
34. See Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 60(b), at 1777.
35. For a definition of discrete task assistance, see supra note 1.
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ing, although some argue such discrete services have been provided in
the business context for many years.36
C. "Brief, Specific Advice": Services Not Requiring a
Diagnostic Interview
Under the Group's recommendations, only services categorized as
"brief, specific advice" do not require a diagnostic interview.3 1 This
analysis begins by applying the recommendations to "brief, specific
advice" services38 and evaluating the implications for confidentiality,
conflicts of interest, and competence. 9
1. Confidentiality
No one disputes that a legal professional providing "brief, specific
advice" should maintain the confidences of the consumer.41 One ob-
jective of the confidentiality provisions is to "facilitate[ ] the full de-
velopment of facts essential to proper representation of the client
36. See, e.g., Dianne Molvig, Unbundling Legal Services, Wis. Law., Sept. 1997, at
10, 12 ("If you mention unbundling to transactional business lawyers, they scratch
their heads and say, 'What's new?"' (quoting William Hornsby, Staff Counsel to
ABA's Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services)); see also Mosten,
supra note 1, at 422-26 (discussing the origins and models of unbundling).
37. See Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 60(a), at 1776.
38. The Group assumed that general advice can be given without any interview
because the content of the advice is not linked to an individual's specific circum-
stances or to a specific set of facts.
39. An alternative approach would evaluate the nature of the relationship be-
tween the legal professional and consumer, and apply the ethical principles based on
the characterization of the consumer as a prospective client, client, or non-client. Be-
cause the recommendations define how the ethical principles apply, this analysis is
unnecessary. If one chose to engage in this analysis, however, one would likely con-
clude that the legal consumer in the brief advice setting is most like a prospective
client. This characterization permits the application of those ethical rules that are
appropriate and avoids over-inclusion of unnecessary, prophylactic provisions. The
lawyer or legal professional's conduct can be monitored under the ethical provisions
and should a serious ethical breach occur, the attorney is subject to the disciplinary
process. Similarly, the lawyer is held to the appropriate standard of care, as defined
by legal malpractice law, providing potential redress for the client. See, e.g., Restate-
ment (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 27(1)(b)(3) (Proposed Final Draft No.
1, 1996) (defining the lawyer's duty to a prospective client as the duty to "use reason-
able care to the extent the lawyer gives the person legal advice or provides other legal
services"). The only substantial argument against considering the recipient of brief
advice a prospective client is that this is a fiction, given the small likelihood the pro-
spective client will ever become a client. See, eg., Tremblay, supra note 3, at 2484-99
(identifying intractable problems of scarce resources and advocating a weighted triage
process).
40. Model Rule 1.6(a) provides that: "A lawyer shall not reveal information relat-
ing to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except
for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation,
and except as stated in paragraph (b)." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.6(a) (1998); see also Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 60(a), at
1776 (noting the ethical rules regarding confidentiality in "brief, specific advice"
situations).
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.... "41 Despite the limited contact between lawyer and consumer,
such candor is no less critical here, and may be even more critical,
given that the consumer will act upon the limited advice provided,
often without further legal assistance. Whether "brief, specific ad-
vice" is provided during a routine intake call to a legal services office,
at an in-person pro bono clinic, or via a hotline, the consumer's confi-
dentiality should be maintained.
The only potential difficulty with this stricture is an advice-only pro
bono clinic, outside of a law office setting where there are many po-
tential consumers and little privacy. One example is a pro bono clinic
conducted at a homeless shelter on a weekly basis. Despite the incon-
venience of maintaining consumer confidences in this and similar set-
tings, the legal professional should be no less, and possibly more,
diligent in protecting the consumer's privacy and confidences.42
2. Conflicts of Interest
Recommendation 60(a) provides that: "[t]he lawyer or legal serv-
ices provider offering brief advice is bound by ... the duty to avoid
conflicts of interest appropriate to the context. '4 3 It further provides
that: "[u]nder the ethical rules governing conflicts of interest which
apply to potential as well as actual conflicts, the lawyer or legal serv-
ices program should not be restricted to the same degree as the lawyer
who renders more extensive representation." 4 In adopting this rec-
ommendation, the Group determined that the conflicts of interest
rules were designed to prevent disclosure of client confidences and to
avoid the risk of divided loyalty.45 The Group sought a method for
satisfying these objectives without unduly restricting providers of lim-
ited legal assistance. Acknowledging the prophylactic nature of con-
flicts of interest provisions, these recommendations apply a less strict
standard to the provider of "brief, specific advice."
41. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 2.; see also Ethics 2000
Comm'n, American Bar Ass'n, Proposed Rule 1.6 (7th working draft, Jan. 11, 1999)
(on file with the author) (proposing an addition to Comment 4, which adds the follow-
ing sentence: "This [confidentiality] contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the
client-lawyer relationship.").
42. A member of the Group suggested that the consumer participating in this
clinic arguably had waived any right to confidentiality, given the setting. This conclu-
sion is problematic. For most homeless people, their only hope of obtaining legal
assistance is in a setting such as this. Encouraging client candor is equally as impor-
tant here as in other contexts.
43. Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 60(a), at 1776.
44. Id.
45. See Report of the Working Group on Limited Legal Assistance, 67 Fordham L.
Rev. 1819, 1838 [hereinafter Working Group Report]; see also Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers § 201 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (stating
that the rationale for conflicts of interest provisions includes assuring clients of undi-
vided loyalty, enhancing effectiveness of representation, safeguarding confidential cli-
ent information, ensuring that lawyers will not exploit clients, and promoting
adequate presentations to tribunals).
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What does this mean in practice? A consumer calls a local legal
services office and asks a basic question about her personal situation,
such as in the two examples outlined above. What duty does the law-
yer or provider of legal services have with respect to avoiding conflicts
of interest prior to answering these questions? Model Rule 1.7,
designed to avoid all potential conflicts, would require the legal serv-
ices provider to make numerous assessments before assisting this
caller.' First, the provider would need to determine if the assistance
to this client is directly adverse to that of another client. 7 Because
the legal services office will not have represented or advised the city
or municipality that issued the tickets, no conflict of interest exists
within the meaning of Model Rule 1.7(a) with respect to them.48
A second inquiry is whether any conflict arises with respect to the
boyfriend. The provider would need to ascertain if the boyfriend is a
program client and, if so, whether advising this caller would be di-
rectly adverse to his interests.49 Following this inquiry, if the boy-
friend is a program client, the provider must determine whether that
relationship is adversely affected by advising this caller and whether
the boyfriend could consent to providing assistance to the caller.50
The provider must also assess whether the program's advice to this
caller would be materially limited by the program's responsibilities to
the boyfriend.5 ' A thorough conflicts check under a Model Rules
analysis would also determine whether or not this caller's interests are
materially adverse to those of any other ongoing program clients.5 2
The Group's recommendations eliminate many of these inquiries.
Given the recommendation that the provider of "brief, specific ad-
vice" need not, with respect to conflicts of interest, be restricted to the
same degree as the lawyer who renders more extensive representa-
46. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7.
47. Model Rule 1.7(a) provides: "A lawyer shall not represent a client if the rep-
resentation of that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) the
lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relation-




50. See id Rule 1.7.
51. Model Rule 1.7(b) provides:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reason-
ably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the
client consents after consultation.
Il Rule 1.7(b).
52. Potentially, an inquiry with respect to former clients could also be required
under Model Rule 1.9(a), which provides: "A lawyer who has formerly represented a
client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a sub-
stantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the
interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation." Id.
Rule 1.9(a).
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tion, what is the extent of the conflicts check that providers of such
advice ought to conduct? Focusing on the objectives of maintaining
client confidences and assuring client loyalty, the program should ter-
minate the communication "as soon as it appears that there may be a
conflict with a previous recipient of brief advice services. '5 3 These
recommendations impose no formal obligation on the provider to en-
gage in a full, program-wide conflicts check. If, however, the caller
provides any information even suggesting a conflict, the provider must
immediately conduct the conflicts check and analyze whether the cli-
ents could consent to the conflict under the Model Rules. 4 Absent
the suggestion of conflict, the program can provide the brief, specific
advice even if it might actually be adverse to another client.
Assume a different set of facts. The resident of a homeless shelter
attends a legal clinic at the shelter and seeks advice about the follow-
ing problem: He and another shelter resident are former roommates.
They each contributed $250 toward a security deposit. When they left
their apartment, the landlord returned the full security deposit to the
other tenant. Can he get his money back from the co-tenant? The
question seems appropriate for the "brief, specific advice" category.
However, one must resolve the extent of the necessary conflicts in-
quiry. Under a Model Rules analysis, a conflicts check would identify
whether or not the lawyer or legal services provider had ever assisted
this landlord or the co-tenant. If the answer was "yes," the program
would then determine whether providing assistance to this prospective
client would be directly adverse to the interests of the landlord or the
other shelter resident, or if representation of this client would be ma-
terially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client.5 As-
suming a "yes" answer to either of those questions, the legal
professional would then need to determine if the client and prospec-
tive client could consent to the conflict.5 6 Even if this prospective cli-
ent eventually obtains assistance, this conflicts-checking process is
resource intensive and time consuming.
It is certainly possible that the co-tenant, also a shelter resident, is
also a recipient of services from this provider. Must the legal profes-
sional do a conflicts check before providing the advice? Such a check
is not required unless "it appears that there may be a conflict."57
Thus, the legal professional could provide the advice without taking
any specific precautions to avoid a conflict. However, if during the
course of answering the question it appears there may be a conflict,
53. Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 60(a), at 1776.
54. Model Rule 1.7(b)(1) provides that the client can, after consultation, consent
to a conflict if "the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad-
versely affected." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b)(1).
55. See id. Rule 1.7.
56. See id.
57. Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 60(a), at 1776.
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the legal professional should determine if a conflict exists, and if so,
should terminate the communication absent appropriate consent.
A related issue concerns who is the "provider" of legal services.
The provider could be a legal services program, a pro bono lawyer
participating in a legal services program, or an "independent" pro
bono lawyer. If the provider is a local legal services office, whatever
conflicts check is conducted shall include at least that particular office.
If the legal professional is a pro bono lawyer participating in a legal-
services-sponsored program, particularly one providing training and
backup support, the conflicts screening process should include that
legal services office.
Assume the shelter's legal professional is a pro bono lawyer either
participating in a pro bono program or working independently who
represents many of the city's rental management companies as a
partner in a large firm. Must a conflicts check be conducted to avoid
conflicts with the lawyer's paying clients? Under these recommenda-
tions, in the scenario outlined above, the lawyer can provide advice to
this consumer without a conflicts check. However, if at any point "it
appears there may be a conflict," she should terminate the communi-
cation. 8 If the pro bono attorney provides traditional representation
to the management company, then an actual conflict of interest exists,
and she should terminate the communication wvith the shelter
resident. 9
A related issue concerns imputed disqualification due to conflicts of
interest. Under a Model Rules analysis, if any member of the firm
represented the management company that had rented to the shelter
resident, the pro bono lawyer would need to cease communication
with the shelter resident, absent consent to the conflict. 60 Although
the limited legal assistance recommendations do not specifically ad-
dress this issue, they do suggest that the standards regarding imputed
disqualification should not be applied rigidly. The recommendations
provide that "the lawyer or legal services program should not be re-
58. See id Although the pro bono lawyer is participating in an organized pro
bono clinic, she remains a member of her own firm. Depending on the structure of
the pro bono clinic, the lawyer may be assisting under the auspices, and malpractice
coverage, of a legal services program. This fact should not, however, alter her obliga-
tion to avoid actual conflicts of interest with her firm's clients.
59. See id.
60. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.10(a). A comment to this
rule states:
The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to
the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a
law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of
lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty
to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by
the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is
associated.
Id. Rule 1.10(a) cmt. 6.
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stricted to the same degree as the lawyer who renders more extensive
representation '' 61 and also distinguish between actual and other con-
flicts. If the pro bono lawyer has no confidential information or
knowledge about this particular firm client, and there is no risk of
divided loyalty, the assistance to the shelter resident would be permis-
sible under the recommendations.62
In the hotline setting, the relaxed standards in the recommenda-
tions suggest that a program need not perform a complete conflicts
check for every caller seeking brief advice.63 Requiring a thorough
conflicts check would create a logistical nightmare, particularly for
programs operating central intake numbers, handling a high volume
of calls, and using substantial numbers of staff and pro bono attorneys.
These recommendations require the organization providing the hot-
line to "develop systems that prevent disclosure of client confidences"
and to "avoid the risk of divided loyalty by terminating the communi-
cation as soon as it appears that there may be a conflict with a previ-
ous recipient of brief advice services. ' 64 The contextual interpretation
of the conflicts of interest provisions imposes a duty to avoid actual
61. Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 60(a), at 1776.
62. Even under a Model Rules analysis, courts are increasingly evaluating whether
the presumption of shared confidences within a law firm can be rebutted. In the
Annotated Model Rules, the legal background section states:
Relevant factors used in rebutting the presumption of shared confidences
include the nature of the former representation, the time lapse between rep-
resentations, the nature of the current association between the tainted law-
yer and the firm sought to be disqualified, the likelihood of contact between
the tainted lawyer and the lawyers responsible for the current matter and the
presence and efficiency of specific institutional mechanisms to prevent the
passage of information.
Center for Prof'l Responsibility, American Bar Ass'n, Annotated Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 172 (1996) (discussing the legal background surrounding Rule
1.10); see also United States for the Use and Benefit of Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pac.
Constr. Corp., 637 F. Supp. 1556, 1566-67 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (determining that confi-
dences had not been shared within a law firm). The Titan court analyzed the lawyers'
of counsel relationship and looked to other evidence in the absence of a screening
device. See id.
63. Because the current literature on hotlines applies the Model Rules, it typically
requires a conflicts check similar to that which would be conducted in a traditional,
full service representation setting. See, e.g., Hotlines, supra note 32, at 8 ("The Hot-
line attorneys, at their orientation, should be instructed to consistently check any pos-
sible conflict of interest before advising a caller."); see also Ethics Advisory Opinion
Comm., Utah State Bar, Opinion 96-12 (1997) (finding that when an attorney pro-
vides general advice over a 900 number, an attorney-client relationship is created, and
all ethical rules apply to that relationship), available in 1997 WL 45137; Standing
Comm. on Prof'I Responsibility and Conduct, State Bar of Cal., Interim Op. 95-0015
(noting that, normally, an attorney-client relationship is formed between callers to a
telephone consultation service and the attorney; even if there is not an attorney cli-
ent-relationship, professional responsibilities attach to the relationship).
64. Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 60(a), at 1776.
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conflicts,65 but only after the potential conflict is brought to the legal
professional's attention.
The extent of the necessary conflicts check in the hotline setting
depends on the nature of the program. One component of this analy-
sis is whether or not the program is one "firm" within the meaning of
the Model Rules.6 6 Relevant factors include the size of the organiza-
tion,67 the structure of the organization,' the degree of communica-
tion between the offices,69 and the administrative and supervisory
connections between the offices.7" A conflict does not automatically
arise simply because the callers to different but affiliated legal services
offices advise prospective clients on opposite sides of a case.
If a program provides diagnostic services or traditional representa-
tion in addition to brief advice service, the program must "have in
place a mechanism to avoid actual conflicts of interest ....71 How-
ever, given that providers of brief advice services "should not be re-
stricted to the same degree as the lawyer who renders more extensive
representation" in the context of conflicts of interest,7 the program
65. See id. In an effort to satisfy the purposes of the conflicts provisions without
unduly restricting client access to legal professionals, the Group's recommendations
refer to "actual" conflicts as distinguished from all potential conflicts. This distinction
is in contrast to the current Model Rules and the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers. See also Ethics 2000 Comm'n, American Bar Ass'n, Proposed Rule 1.7 cmt.
1 (7th working draft, Jan. 11, 1999) (on file with author) (indicating that proposed
language regarding actual and potential conflicts was deleted from Comment 1, and
deemed "meaningless when conflict is defined to mean the presence of risk that harm
will occur").
66. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.10 cmt. 3 (1998) (noting
what constitutes a firm).
Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization consti-
tute a firm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the
case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be treated as
associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved,
and on the specific facts of the situation.
IL; see also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 203 cmt. d(v) (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (noting that lawyers in same legal services agency may
represent conflicting interests if adequate measures are taken to protect confidential
client information so it will not be available to other lawyers).
67. See, &g., English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Lab., Inc, 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1507 (D.
Colo. 1993) (finding the presumption of imputed confidences was rebutted in light of
the firm's size). But see Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d
1311, 1321 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[T]here is no basis for creating separate disqualification
rules for large firms.").
68. See People v. Wilkins, 268 N.E.2d 756, 757 (N.Y. 1971) (finding that the rule
of imputed disqualification does not apply to a large public defense organization such
as the Legal Aid Society).
69. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1309 (1975) (stating that the relationship between two organizations did not prevent
lawyers in those offices from accepting employment on different sides of a contro-
versy where there was "no exchange of personnel, no exchange of information and no
controlling or supervisory relationship").
70. See id.
71. Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 60(a), at 1776.
72. Id
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need not avoid all potential conflicts. Similarly, it need not screen
initially to avoid imputed conflicts or the appearance of conflicts."
3. Competency
Indisputably, the advice provided in the "brief, specific advice" set-
ting must be competently given.74 Applying the competency standard
to this setting raises two additional questions: (1) To what should the
competency requirement apply; (2) What redress exists for the con-
sumer if the limited service, i.e., the "brief, specific advice," is not
competently provided.
Assessing whether the advice given was competent is fairly straight-
forward. One need only examine the question asked of the legal serv-
ices program, and the answer given. Returning to one of the fact
scenarios presented above, if the legal professional's answer to the
question regarding the parking tickets is accurate, the advice is
competent.75
The more complicated question concerns the professional judgment
with respect to defining the legal question. Circumstances will un-
doubtedly arise in which it would be incompetent to answer one or
two questions only, without knowing more.76 The critical question is
was it incumbent upon the legal professional to ask a series of addi-
tional questions, thereby converting this "advice only" service into
one requiring a diagnostic interview. The competency requirement
must apply to the initial screening decision that this question is appro-
priate for brief advice only.
In the hotline context, it may be possible to answer a discrete ques-
tion or set of questions and provide limited advice.77 However, the
legal professional, relying on her experience and judgment, will need
to determine what is an appropriate question for "brief, specific ad-
73. Even under a Model Rules analysis, a lawyer or legal services entity need not
screen to prevent the appearance of impropriety with respect to potential conflicts
between former clients and current clients. See, e.g., Waters v. Kemp, 845 F.2d 260,
265 (11th Cir. 1988) (denying a motion to disqualify court-appointed counsel based on
Canon 9 of the Model Code, which states "[a] lawyer should avoid even the appear-
ance of professional impropriety," because under the governing Model Rules, "the
appearance of impropriety is not a ground for disqualifying a lawyer from represent-
ing a party to a lawsuit").
74. Model Rule 1.1 provides: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation
to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thorough-
ness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 (1998).
75. This suggests the need to keep records of all advice given to determine in the
future that the services were competently provided. See, e.g., Hotlines, supra note 32,
at 41 (requiring hotline attorneys to take detailed notes of the facts of a case and the
advice given to a client).
76. See, e.g., McNeal, supra note 1, at 318-30 (exploring the ethical implications of
providing unbundled services to elderly clients).
77. See Hotlines, supra note 32, at 2.
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vice."78 If she exercises this judgment competently and provides com-
petent advice, she has met this ethical standard.
A major concern is the redress available for the consumer if the
"brief, specific advice" is not competently provided. The hotline
caller has the traditional protections afforded by the legal malpractice
standards. Realistically, however, pursuing a claim is expensive, time
consuming, and inefficient.7 9 Seeking redress is further complicated
by the nature of the service provided, i.e., brief advice, and proof may
be a problem."0
If the hotline advice is provided by an attorney, or other legal pro-
fessional assisting under the supervision of an attorney,"' the attorney
is subject to the bar's disciplinary process. The purpose of this process
is to discipline the attorney and protect the public, especially future
clients. Because the consumer is not a party to the disciplinary pro-
ceeding and it rarely provides her with compensation or relief, its
value to this consumer is limited. 2
D. Services Requiring a Diagnostic Interview
Under the recommendations, all services other than "brief, specific
advice" require a diagnostic interview.s Because the diagnostic inter-
view plays a critical role in this analysis, it is worthy of brief discus-
sion. One purpose of the diagnostic interview is to elicit facts.
Elicited facts might include information about the legal problem, the
opposing party, and the forum or context in which the legal problem
arises. The diagnostic interview also involves "probing for hidden is-
78. See id at 19. "The concept behind the Hotline is that very experienced people
should be used to handle the calls. This insures that advice is based on a practical
knowledge of the law and that all issues are identified and addressed." Id.
79. See Paul Rheingold, Legal Malpractice: Plaintiffs' Strategies, Litigation, Win-
ter 1989, at 13, 13 (noting the need to carefully value legal malpractice cases because
they are expensive and time consuming).
80. At least one hotline manual recommends that hotline attorneys "make de-
tailed notes in the computer on the facts of the case and the advice given to the
client." Hotlines, supra note 32, at 41. This manual also recommends a sophisticated
computer system to record all telephone contacts, conduct efficient conflict checks,
and assemble forms and documents. See id. at 32.
81. Model Rule 5.3(b) provides that "a lawyer having direct supervisory authority
over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct
is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer." Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Rule 5.3(b) (1998). The comment further provides that lawyers
should be responsible for the work product of assistants in their employ. See id. Rule
5.3(b) cmt.
82. Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice, § 1.9, at 41 (4th ed.
1996) (distinguishing between ethical rules and civil liability, the authors note the
"prophylactic purpose" of the ethical provisions and that the injured client who initi-
ates a disciplinary action is not a party to that proceeding).
83. See Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 60(b), at 1777. For a
discussion of diagnostic interviews in the context of a pro se family law clinic, see
Michael Millemann et al., supra note 25, at 1182.
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sues." 84 The interviewer seeks to learn enough about the consumer to
make a determination about the range of services appropriate for this
particular person.85 Factors that the legal professional might assess
include the potential client's emotional stability as well as her ability
to understand the limited nature of the services to be provided, to
read pro se materials, to write, and to proceed without traditional
representation.86
Evaluating specific facts provided by a consumer during a diagnos-
tic interview is relatively easy. The legal professional can assess the
complexity of the legal problem, the nature of the forum in which the
consumer will be proceeding and its receptiveness to pro se litigants,
and the potential consequences of a bad result. Assessments about
this particular consumer, however, and her ability to proceed in a spe-
cific setting, are more problematic. They are not formulaic, and are
necessarily subjective. They require good judgment87 and experience
in working with people from diverse backgrounds with a myriad of
social problems. Diagnostic interviewers should also be knowledgea-
ble about the law and the legal system. Based on the information ob-
tained during the interview, the legal professional will provide the
consumer with a range of appropriate, limited legal assistance
choices.88
A second goal of the diagnostic process is to provide the consumer
with sufficient information "to make an informed decision about how
to proceed."89 This disclosure should include a description of the op-
84. Milleman, et al., supra note 25, at 1182.
85. See id. In the context of a family law pro se clinic:
[To determine the type and level of legal services clients may require,] the
diagnostic interviewer must understand the whole body of family law and be
good at eliciting facts, evaluating people, and probing for hidden issues....
The client may also be less able than she appears to perform an essential
task, or to understand, accept or act on legal advice.
Id.
86. Critics of this process will likely assert that it is paternalistic for the legal pro-
fessional to make such assessments about the client during this initial diagnostic inter-
view, see generally Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Responsibility: Ethics by the
Pervasive Method, 411-24 (1994) (discussing paternalism in various attorney-client re-
lationships), and that it is time-consuming. Although I do not underestimate the chal-
lenge of making such assessments in a brief interview and simultaneously respecting
clients' autonomy, I believe that lawyers and other legal professionals regularly make
such assessments about clients, although our conclusions are rarely articulated.
87. For a discussion on the role of judgment in lawyering, see, e.g., David Luban &
Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 31 (1995).
88. The Group spent substantial time discussing the role of client choice and con-
sent in this context. Recognizing the limitations of informed consent where the op-
tions are narrow, the Group determined that the provider should offer as wide a range
of choices to the client as is appropriate under the circumstances. See Working Group
Report, supra note 45, at 1821-22.
89. Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 60(b), at 1777.
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tions, information about what is required of the consumer, and an out-
line of the pros and cons of each option.90 Recommendation Sixty
requires a statement as to the limited nature of the services to be pro-
vided, information about when the recommended course of action
might change, and information about "when additional services might
be necessary."'" The goal is to prevent a legal consumer from relying
on a small modicum of advice and inappropriately applying it to an
array of circumstances.
Effective diagnostic interviewing is critical for the success of limited
legal assistance.9" Weaknesses in a provider's diagnostic process could
severely injure the legal consumer and have a more profound effect
than they would in the traditional, full service context. Critics of the
diagnostic interview will likely assert that this requirement diminishes
the value of limited legal assistance, given the time involved. How-
ever, this assessment is the primary mechanism to assure that clients
obtain services that are valuable to them. It also prevents limited
legal assistance from becoming a routine mechanism for delivering
legal services that has no relationship to client need, problem type,
and resolution context.
Under the recommendations, a diagnostic interview is required for
all services except "brief, specific advice." Diagnostic interviews will
most often be required in the following contexts: pro se clinics, form
pleadings, ghostwriting, hotlines (in all circumstances other than those
described above), and other forms of discrete task assistance.93 These
services may be offered individually or in combination with each
other. As in the "brief, specific advice" context, critical issues arise
regarding confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and competence.'9
90. This is similar to a mini-counseling session. See generally David A. Binder et
al., Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach (1991) (discussing models
of client counseling).
91. Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 60(b), at 1777.
92. See Millemann et al., supra note 25, at 1182.
93. Technically, one might include "general advice" among the categories of pro
se assistance. However, I have eliminated "general advice" from this list because this
discussion is narrowly focused on the limited legal assistance services in the middle of
the continuum of legal services. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text. For
definition of discrete task assistance, see supra note 1.
94. Again, an alternative approach would be to define the nature of the relation-
ship in the diagnostic interview setting. The most practical way to characterize this
relationship is as an attorney-client relationship. The reasons for this are numerous.
First, the legal professional will be providing extensive services for the client, includ-
ing as part of the diagnostic interview, the exchange of confidential information, an
analysis of the client's situation and what limited services are most appropriate, and,
potentially, the collection of additional information when providing the actual, limited
service. Second, the Model Rules permit the attorney and client to limit the scope of
the representation. Model Rule 1.2(c) provides: "A lawyer may limit the objectives
of the representation if the client consents after consultation." Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Rule 1.2(c) (1998); see also Restatement (Third) of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers § 30 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (stating that a lawvyer and
client can agree to limit a duty a law\yer would otherwise owe, provided the client
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1. Confidentiality
Given that the diagnostic interview will generate detailed informa-
tion about the consumer, maintaining confidentiality is even more im-
perative in this context than in the "brief, specific advice" setting.
Additionally, candor is particularly important given that a full and
honest depiction of the facts is essential in determining the appropri-
ate range of services.
In the pro se clinic setting, confidentiality issues may arise occasion-
ally. If a consumer asks a question revealing specific information
about her case in the classroom setting, the consumer has waived her
right to confidentiality with respect to those in the class, but not to
others. The legal services provider remains bound by obligations of
confidentiality.95 With respect to form pleadings, hotlines, ghost-
writing, and other forms of discrete task representation, information
obtained during the diagnostic interview and pursuant to providing
the service must be kept confidential.
2. Conflicts of Interest
Because the diagnostic interview creates an attorney-client relation-
ship, under a Model Rules conflicts of interest analysis, the lawyer or
legal services program would be required to screen for representation
that would be directly adverse to that of another client.96 The client
could consent to the conflict, but only if the "lawyer reasonably be-
lieves the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with
the other client."97 The program should also screen to determine if
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client would materially limit
the representation.98 In determining whether the conflict precludes
representation, "[t]he critical questions are the likelihood that a con-
flict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere
with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering
alternatives or foreclos[ing] courses of action that reasonably should
be pursued on behalf of the client."99 Ideally, this screening should
occur before the diagnostic interview.
agrees and the limitations are reasonable). Characterizing the consumer as a client
provides additional protections in the area of conflicts of interest and redress from
attorney error or negligence. This characterization implicates the ethical rules regard-
ing conflicts of interest, and, under the recommendations, requires a screening in all
situations except when the other party is the recipient of brief advice. See infra Part
II.D.2. If the legal professional does not perform competently or violates an ethical
provision, the client has a means of redress through a malpractice action and poten-
tially via the attorney discipline process.
95. The application of the attorney-client privilege is a different issue, which I will
not address.
96. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(a).
97. Id. Rule 1.7(a)(1).
98. See id. Rule 1.7(b).
99. Id. Rule 1.7 cmt. 4.
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The recommendations are silent as to how the conflicts provisions
should apply to limited legal services requiring a diagnostic interview.
Many clients in need of limited legal assistance would be screened out
under a strict Model Rules analysis, given that the rules are prophy-
lactic and designed to identify "the presence of risk that harm will
occur." 100 A potential consequence of strictly interpreting the Model
Rules in the diagnostic interview setting is the risk that providers
would define services that should require a diagnostic interview as
"brief, specific advice" in an attempt to avoid the strict conflicts
requirements.
A contextual application of the conflicts of interest provisions is
more workable. Conflicts of interest provisions are designed to pro-
tect clients from divided attorney loyalties, and to prevent confidential
information from being shared to the client's detriment.'' A primary
objective of the contextual approach is to satisfy these goals without
hindering access to legal assistance.
In evaluating the contextual approach, it is helpful to apply it to the
limited legal assistance settings. Beginning with pro se classes, pro-
grams should at minimum screen to avoid placing together in a pro se
class individuals for whom an actual conflict exists, such as spouses
seeking a divorce. Although many pro se classes do not address indi-
vidual client issues, there is always the risk that case-specific questions
will arise.102 If clients with actual conflicts are not screened out, the
legal professional will be forced to choose among clients and would by
definition have divided loyalties, the very things the conflicts provi-
sions are designed to avoid.
The next concern in the pro se clinic context is clients whose inter-
ests may be adverse in another matter, but not in this particular mat-
ter. For example, clients attending a pro se family law class together
may be on opposing sides of a landlord-tenant dispute. Whether that
is permissible depends on whether the program can serve both con-
sumers and satisfy the purposes of the conflict provisions, i.e., main-
taining loyalty and confidentiality. If not, a strict interpretation of the
Rules should be applied prohibiting assistance absent appropriate cli-
ent and consumer consent. 10 3
The greater challenge is defining a contextual interpretation of the
conflicts principles in a program providing a range of services, includ-
100. Ethics 2000 Comm'n, American Bar Ass'n, Proposed Rule 1.7 (6th working
draft, Nov. 16, 1998) (on file with author).
101. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers, § 201 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (noting that the two purposes of the conflicts of interest
provisions are assuring clients of undivided loyalty and safeguarding confidential cli-
ent information).
102. See Barry, supra note 22, at 1210-13.
103. In contrast, comment three to Model Rule 1.7 provides that when client inter-
ests are only generally adverse client consent is not required. Model Rules of Profes-
sional Responsiblity Rule 1.7 cmt. 3.
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ing pro se classes. For example, can a program represent one client
with traditional, full-service representation and another client in the
pro se class if they have an actual conflict of interest? Or, can a pro-
gram assist clients on opposite sides of a family law matter with two
different forms of limited legal assistance? For example, one client
might attend the pro se classes and another may receive form plead-
ings or ghostwriting assistance. Under current interpretations of the
Model Rules, each of these scenarios would create an impermissible
conflict, although potentially one that could be waived.
Applying a contextual analysis, a variety of factors determine the
best approach. Factors to be considered include the size of the pro-
gram, the number of personnel involved, the likelihood that the same
personnel could be involved in providing limited legal services to both
clients, the degree to which the program is integrated, the location of
the various services, the size of the geographic area served, the popu-
lation of the community, and whether or not consumer information is
catalogued in a unitary database. A principle consideration is to what
extent it is likely that confidential information regarding a particular
client will be shared with someone having knowledge of specific infor-
mation about an opposing client, to the detriment of either or both
clients. If examination of the above factors demonstrates that client
confidentiality can be maintained and divided loyalties avoided, the
program may provide services to both clients.
This problem becomes more complex if one of the recipients of lim-
ited services seeks additional assistance. Assume the same example,
where one spouse is receiving form pleadings and another is partici-
pating in the pro se family law class. The client in the class may seek
additional assistance, and even full-service representation, if the fam-
ily law case unexpectedly becomes contested. Can the program pro-
vide that representation? The conclusion may depend on what that
additional assistance would be. For example, if the case has become
exceedingly complicated, such as a custody dispute with conflicting
professional evaluations of the parents, a second diagnostic interview
may indicate the need for traditional representation. However, confi-
dential information will have been obtained as a result of the diagnos-
tic interview and potentially additional information obtained while
providing the limited legal assistance. Because these two consumers
have an actual conflict and given the risk that confidential information
obtained from one party could be used to the detriment of the other,
the Model Rules should be applied to prohibit representation of both
parties.10 4
Similarly, the lawyer who is "ghostwriting" pleadings on behalf of a
client will have conducted a diagnostic interview. The lawyer will also
need additional information in order to competently complete the
104. See id. Rule 1.7.
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pleadings on behalf of the client, potentially as much information as
one would need to engage in full service representation. Therefore,
the lawyer would need to screen for conflicts with other clients the
lawyer represents in the traditional fashion. In this situation, the law-
yer should be bound by the current interpretations of the Model Rules
to avoid all potential conflicts of interest.
The contextual conflicts interpretation has two primary advantages.
First, the fluidity of the rule's interpretation enables more clients to be
served. Second, it eliminates the arbitrary principle of avoiding con-
flicts of interest, which often functions to screen out applicants for
assistance who do not have any real conflict. Potential disadvantages
of this approach are the risk of inappropriate application of the con-
textual standard, the potential reorganization of programs to permit
looser application of conflicts principles, and the unknowing creation
of actual conflicts.
The contextual application provides that only those clients or con-
sumers whose cases present actual conflicts shall be deemed "con-
flicted out." If a program offers different forms of limited legal
assistance through separate and distinct units, the delivery of legal
assistance to consumers with actual conflicts may be permitted.
3. Competence
How should one measure competence in the context of limited legal
assistance requiring a diagnostic interview? Because Model Rule 1.1
envisions only traditional, full service representation,10 5 it is of little
assistance in determining how this standard might be applied through-
out the diagnostic process.
Obviously, the provider must competently provide whatever service
she chooses to provide. Preliminarily, this includes the diagnostic in-
terview. A competent diagnosis does the following: (1) defines the
nature of the legal problem; (2) determines the relevant facts to
gather; (3) identifies the client's goals; (4) determines the range of
services likely to accomplish the client's goals; and (5) determines the
range of assistance appropriate for the client in light of the above in-
quiries. The most challenging aspect of this process is the last compo-
nent, determining the range of appropriate services.106 This requires
sophisticated judgment applied to a limited set of facts and to a person
with whom one has had limited contact. This is also where the stan-
dard is most likely to be breached.
105. See id. Rule 1.1.
106. See, e.g., Lonnie A. Powers, Pro Bono and Pro Se: Letting Clients Order Off
the Menu Without Giving Yourself Indigestion, B. Bar J., May/June 1998, at 10, 10-11
("[T]he major ethical issues in discrete task representation are being sure that you
give complete, competent legal advice and that you assess the ability of the client to
act on the advice.").
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Recommendation 60(b) states that the provider of the diagnostic
service must also provide the client with sufficient information for the
client to have "knowledge of the circumstances under which the rec-
ommended course of action might change and when additional serv-
ices might be necessary.' 1 0 7 This critical part of the diagnostic
assessment is designed to protect the client from oversimplifying the
process and to encourage the client to seek additional assistance
should the facts change. It also must be performed competently.
The competency standard applies to other components of limited
legal assistance beyond the diagnostic interview. In the pro se clinic
setting, the pro se class must be conducted competently. 108 The pro-
vider must exercise due diligence to assure that information is pro-
vided in a manner easily understood, and must be both a competent
practitioner and a competent teacher.10 9
In the form pleadings context, the competency standard first arises,
again, with the diagnostic interview. The second application is to the
pleadings or forms themselves. The forms should take into account all
applicable law and procedures, and should define when they apply.
They must be "user friendly" and constructed with sufficient care to
inform clients of potential problems, as well as when clients should
abandon this methodology and seek additional assistance. The forms
should be accompanied by a set of instructions for appropriate filing,
information about any required fees, and information regarding when
clients can expect a response from the opposing party or the court.110
This information should be accurate, based on experience in that sub-
stantive area and in that forum, and designed to assist the client in
achieving the results she seeks. Once the initial "diagnosis" has been
completed, the legal professional must make a competent assessment
as to the appropriate forms for this particular consumer.
A lawyer choosing to engage in ghostwriting must competently as-
sess this client's ability to accomplish her goals with ghostwritten
pleadings."' This requires an assessment of the client's ability to ad-
107. Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 60(b), at 1777.
108. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 22, at 1883. (reviewing the use of pro se clinics as a
means of providing successful legal services for pro se litigants).
109. See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Lawyer as Teacher: The Role of Educa-
tion in Lawyering, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 359, 361-71 (1998) (expounding upon the numer-
ous tasks lawyers perform in their role as teachers and outlining models for preparing
lawyers to be good teachers). For an extensive discussion of the role of community
education among lawyers for poor people, see Ingrid Eagly, Community Education:
Creating a New Vision of Legal Services Practice, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 433 (1998).
110. One mechanism to assure that the forms "work" is to develop them in collabo-
ration with the courts, service providers, client groups, community advocates, and
others who have experience within this system. In the Maryland family law experi-
ment, the forms were developed by the Family and Juvenile Law Subcommittee of the
Maryland Rules Committee. See Millemann et al., supra note 25, at 1182 n.15.
111. Attorneys ghostwriting pleadings for clients should remain cognizant that
courts have condemned this procedure. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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vocate effectively for herself and the receptiveness of the applicable
setting to pro se litigants. If the lawyer concludes that this particular
client is not likely to succeed proceeding pro se with the ghostvritten
pleadings, the lawyer should not prepare them for the client.112
Once the client chooses ghostvriting from the range of limited legal
assistance options, the lawyer must elicit additional facts to assist her
in drafting the pleadings. The lawyer must utilize at least the same
degree of care she would in the traditional full service model. Argua-
bly, a higher degree of care is required here since it will be more diffi-
cult for the client proceeding pro se to rectify any errors or omissions.
Once the pleadings have been filed, should the lawyer have any ob-
ligation to assist, particularly if a problem arises due to the lawyer's
failure to adequately investigate? If the client's difficulty is due to an
omission by the lawyer, the lawyer should provide, and should be obli-
gated to provide, additional assistance. If the difficulty is not the law-
yer's "fault," the result should depend on the seriousness of the
problem, and whether or not the client can successfully accomplish
her goals without further legal assistance. A balance should be struck
between a standard so strict that it will discourage lawyers from pro-
viding ghostwriting assistance and one so lenient that it will poten-
tially harm clients.
In other discrete-task-assistance contexts, the competency standard
imposes on the lawyer a burden to assure that this assistance will help
the client achieve her goals. It requires an analysis of other issues that
might arise as a result of providing this service, issues for which the
client may need, or at least should be offered, assistance."
3
III. THE "LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS" STANDARD: AN
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO LIMITED
LEGAL ASSISTANCE
The Working Group on Limited Legal Assistance examined the in-
terrelationship between limited legal assistance and existing ethical
norms, and determined what changes should be made to encourage
innovation in the delivery of legal services. However, this approach
may have been premature.
Presumably, the primary goal is to assist legal consumers in ob-
taining just resolutions of their legal problems. An alternative ap-
proach to that goal is to focus on the client's "likelihood of success"
with the limited legal assistance obtained. One should ask what im-
pediments hinder the client in translating the limited legal assistance
into a successful resolution of the problem. The nature and extent of
these impediments then determine the viability of appropriate limited
legal assistance.
112. For further discussion of this issue, see McNeal, supra note 1, at 331-33.
113. See id at 303-11.
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An empirical investigation of the use of the implied warranty of
habitability in the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial Dis-
trict illustrates this point dramatically. 14 This study by UCLA law
students and faculty concluded that despite established law on the im-
plied warranty of habitability, "[a]n owner of a substandard building
faces essentially zero risk that a tenant will succeed in defending an
eviction based on those substandard housing conditions."'1 5 More
specifically, of fifty-one tenants receiving paralegal assistance in draft-
ing habitability defenses and then proceeding unrepresented in court,
none were successful in raising their defenses.'16 This study deter-
mined that major causes for the tenants' lack of success were gross
misapplication of the law and the court's imposition of additional
proof requirements on tenants." 7 Other factors include the court's
failure to provide interpreters for tenants who do not speak English,
the tenants' lack of sophistication, and the complexity of the law." 8
As this study demonstrates, a critical component of a "likelihood of
success" analysis is the receptivity of the forum to pro se litigants.119
Aspects of this assessment include the willingness of the court to apply
the law and procedure accurately, to permit unrepresented litigants to
raise their claims,1 20 and to expend the necessary resources to resolve
issues fairly.
Another component of this analysis is the capacity of the client to
proceed after obtaining the limited legal assistance.1 2' Aspects of this
inquiry include the client's literacy, intellectual ability, vulnerability
(emotional, financial, and physical), emotional fortitude, and determi-
nation.12 2 These factors should be analyzed in conjunction with those
114. See Telephone Interview with Gary Blasi, Professor at UCLA School of Law
(Jan. 25, 1999) (referencing the Executive Summary of the Report of the Blue-Ribbon
Citizens' Committee on Slum Housing (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author) [hereinafter Executive Summary], a summary of a study conducted by
UCLA law students regarding the success rate of pro se litigants raising habitability
defenses).
115. Executive Summary, supra note 114, at 2.
116. See Telephone Interview with Gary Blasi, supra note 114. In this study of fifty-
five cases that went to trial, landlords were successful in eight-four percent of the
cases. Only those tenants with lawyers won at trial. See Executive Summary, supra
note 114, at 3.
117. See Executive Summary, supra note 114, at 3.
118. See id.
119. See generally id. at 1-4 (discussing the Blue-Ribbon Citizen's Committee's
findings on the civil justice system's role in regulating substandard housing
conditions).
120. For an interesting analysis of the inability of tenants to raise claims in eviction
matters, see generally Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subor-
dination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 538-39
(1992).
121. See, e.g., McNeal, supra note 1, at 336-38 (advocating that a lawyer providing
unbundled services to the elderly must determine the client's ability to complete re-
maining legal tasks).
122. In the Maryland family law experiment, a project analysis determined that
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defined above, cognizant of the obvious tension between determining
a prospective client's ability to proceed on her own and paternalism.
A third factor in this assessment is the complexity of the problem or
issue the consumer seeks to resolve." m For example, litigants without
children, resources, and property can end their marriages relatively
easily, and those litigants may be successful with pro se assistance.12 4
In contrast, legal consumers with complex custody disputes are less
likely to be successful if their only legal assistance is a pro se class or
form pleadings.'1 The diagnostic interview process should assist in
determining who needs what level of assistance.1 26
A fourth factor concerns the seriousness of the particular problem
and the ramifications for this particular client. Some legal issues have
more dramatic consequences than others. Ramifications may be legal,
financial, social, moral, emotional, and physical. 27 In the landlord-
tenant context, for example, exploring the ramifications would include
an analysis of the housing the client stands to lose (including whether
or not it is subsidized) her capacity to locate alternative housing at a
reasonable cost, and her willingness to engage in a protracted dispute
with her landlord. Evaluating these factors requires an extensive dis-
cussion with the client about her goals and objectives."'
A final factor of this "likelihood of success" analysis is the power
dynamic between the parties. Common disputes with classic power
imbalances that may influence the results in litigation, negotiation, or
what distinguished the capable from the incapable pro se litigant in these
cases was not the difference between a high school or college education.
Rather, it was more basic factors: the ability to speak and read English; a
basic intelligence level; the absence of emotional and mental disabilities; and
some degree of self-motivation, among other qualities.
Millemann et al., supra note 25, at 1183 (citing Nathalie Gilfrich et al., The Family
Law Assisted Pro Se Project, University of Md. Sch. of Law, Report on the University
of Maryland School of Law's Pro Se Project in Anne Arundel and Montgomery
Counties, and Recommendations 7-8 (1996)).
123. See McNeal, supra note 1, at 299-303.
124. See Millemann et al., supra note 25, at 1183-84.
125. See id. at 1184.
126. In his analysis of the Maryland pro se family law experiment, Millemann de-
fines three categories of legal problems that the project addressed: (1) those that
could be resolved with "mechanical justice" (including uncontested divorces, ob-
taining default custody orders, and obtaining consent custody orders); (2) those that
required limited judgment and discretion (often cases labeled as contested but only
because one of the parties did not know the law); and (3) those requiring -substantial
legal judgment and discretion" (such as advice to help avoid physical abuse, child
abductions, and child support arrearages). See id. at 1183-85. This analysis concluded
that project participants were most satisfied when the issue required only -mechanical
justice" and increasingly less satisfied as the degree of complex judgment required
increased. Id. at 1185.
127. See Binder et al., supra note 90, at 295-96.
128. See, eg., id. at 272-73 (eliciting client objectives plays an important role in a
lawyer's counseling with the client).
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mediation settings are landlord-tenant disputes 129 and domestic vio-
lence situations. The extent of this imbalance, particularly when com-
bined with an analysis of the forum, will affect the viability of pro se
classes, form pleadings, hotlines, ghostwriting, and brief advice for a
given client.
Analyzing these factors in any given setting is quite challenging. As
addressed below, a future research agenda should include a study of
the critical factors in various kinds of cases. Because we know little
about the ramifications of limited legal assistance, this results-oriented
perspective is essential.
IV. RESEARCH AGENDA
An underlying assumption of this discussion is that potential low-
income clients would prefer to have limited legal assistance rather
than no legal assistance. While this is probably accurate, we do not
know what prospective clients or low-income people in need of legal
services want but are not getting from lawyers. 130 Assuming individu-
als will want different things, a delivery system should make a variety
of approaches available.'
3 1
In light of the above discussion, including the "likelihood of suc-
cess" approach to assessing limited legal assistance, a research agenda
should include five components. The first component is information
on what types of services prospective consumers want. This data will
be helpful as the profession continues to fashion alternative delivery
models, particularly in light of evolving technologies.
The second component of a research agenda is determining whether
the recipient of limited legal assistance was aided in obtaining the re-
sults she wanted. 32 This raises two issues: (1) whether the client got
129. See generally Bezdek, supra note 120, at 536-41 (examining the social relations
and power imbalances in the landlord-tenant context).
130. Many who promote limited legal assistance models do so in the vein of client
empowerment and client interest in self-help, see, e.g., Mosten, supra, note 1, at 427-
30 (discussing three models for providing unbundled legal services), but little data
exists about who in the client community wants what.
131. See Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 65, at 1778. Recom-
mendation Sixty-five provides:
A delivery system of legal services for low-income persons ... should ensure
delivery of a full range of services including the following: class, group, and
individual representation; legislative and administrative advocacy at the
state and local level; and counseling, advice, and community education. A
delivery system that only provides advice and brief legal services cannot
meet this goal.
Id. For further discussion of assessment issues, see Gregg G. Van Ryzin & Marianne
Engelman Lado, Evaluating Systems for Delivering Legal Services to the Poor: Con-
ceptual and Methodological Considerations, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2553 (1999).
132. Outcome is, of course, only one measure of client satisfaction. Other meas-
ures might include whether the client was able to tell her story, if she felt empowered
by the experience and whether she focused the court's attention on systematic
problems.
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the information she wanted at the time she asked the question; and (2)
whether that information helped her resolve her legal problem or
legal issue. Measuring the first inquiry is relatively simple. Recipients
of limited legal assistance can be surveyed to determine if they re-
ceived responsive information or assistance.
Determining whether the assistance obtained was helpful is much
more difficult to measure and involves an assessment of whether the
consumer resolved the problem with the limited assistance she ob-
tained.'33 For example, it might include asking what happened when
she proceeded pro se in housing court, armed with the information
she received from the hotline. Or an assessment of whether a tenant
equipped with the form pleadings successfully raised code violations
as a defense to a rent action. 134 Questions that might be asked in-
clude: Was she able to state her claim? 3- Was she permitted to put
forth her evidence? Was she able to successfully convey the points
that she wanted to with the evidence she presented? What was the
outcome? Finally, would additional legal assistance have resulted in a
different outcome?
The research agenda should also include an assessment organized
by substantive areas of law. For example, a common method of pro-
viding limited legal assistance is through pro se family law clinics. Ad-
ditional research should measure whether these clinics and clinics in
other substantive areas enable consumers to obtain the results they
seek.' 36 The results of such surveys would determine settings in which
additional limited legal assistance models should be developed, set-
tings in which they are less effective, and the critical aspects of effec-
tive delivery in each substantive area.
A fourth component of measuring the effectiveness of limited legal
assistance is to analyze who uses these services. Comprehensively
studying a variety of delivery methods will provide data about which
prospective clients are accessing the various methodologies. Demo-
graphic data should include gender, age, education level, race, geo-
graphical location, family proffle, and disabilities. Cross-referencing
this data with the substantive area information will help determine
133. Obviously, an assessment must take into account that, even with traditional
full service representation, not all claims are successful nor are all legal problems
happily resolved.
134. See, e.g., Executive Summary, supra note 114, at 3 (discussing tenants' inability
to raise habitability claims in the municipal court of Los Angeles).
135. See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 120, at 558-66 (documenting the inability of ten-
ants to successfully raise claims in rent court).
136. For one such study, see id. at 1183-86. See also Van Ry-zin & Engelman Lado,
supra note 131, at 2558-61 (suggesting that an effective evaluation of the delivery of
legal services requires a clear articulation of the goals and objectives of the activities
provided).
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which methodologies work for which consumers to address which
problems.1 37
An assessment of limited legal assistance should compare outcomes
in these settings to those in the traditional, full service settings. 138 De-
spite thirty years of organized legal services for the poor, poverty law-
yers have not adequately measured the effectiveness of our work.' 39
Data should be collected to determine the impact of providing legal
services to low-income people, and to compare the relative merits of
limited and traditional delivery models.
Finally, a theoretical issue worthy of scrutiny involves the continua-
tion of one uniform body of ethical provisions. After discussing the
merits and detriments of specific ethical provisions applying only to
advocates for low-income clients, the Working Group on Limited
Legal Assistance determined that it was preferable to have one set of
ethical provisions applicable to the profession as a whole. 140 I suspect
most advocates for the poor would support this position. However,
one wonders whether separate ethical provisions are a logical devel-
opment from the expanding notion of contextual rule interpretations.
Is it logical to assert that the contextual application is permissible but
dual sets of ethical provisions are not? More study, analysis, and dis-
cussion of this issue will assist the profession in resolving this difficult
question.
V. ASSESSMENT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The Fordham Conference's recommendations on limited legal
assistancel41 are a critical first step in analyzing the ethical and profes-
sional issues implicated by limited legal assistance delivery models.
They are an important development in what must be ongoing analysis
and discussion, as well as research on mechanisms for increasing ac-
cess to justice for low-income people.
Applying selected limited legal assistance recommendations to de-
livery models provides insight on how these concepts work in practice.
It also highlights both the strengths and weaknesses of the recommen-
dations. A significant strength of the recommendations is the creation
of two categories of limited legal assistance: "brief, specific advice"
137. For factors influencing litigants' ability to proceed pro se in the family law
area, see supra notes 122, 126.
138. See Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 121, at 1796-97 (one
goal of assessment is to "compare the effectiveness of traditional and innovative deliv-
ery systems/strategies").
139. See generally Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83
Geo. L.J. 1529, 1542-58 (1995) (arguing that legal services lawyers have failed to ade-
quately identify legal problems of the poor, to be knowledgeable of the economic,
political and social contexts in which these problems arise, and to evaluate potential
strategies).
140. See Recommendations, supra note 4, Recommendation 52, at 1775.
141. See id. Recommendations 47-64, at 1774-78.
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and "services requiring a diagnostic interview."14 2 Examining delivery
methods from this perspective permits varying interpretations of the
applicable ethical rules and provides guidelines for providers of lim-
ited legal assistance.
A second strength of the recommendations is the use of the "diag-
nostic interview." Perhaps the critical component of providing limited
legal assistance, it enables the legal services provider to avoid many of
the pitfalls of offering limited legal assistance and offers assurance to
the client that an appropriate range of services will be offered.
The contextual interpretation of selected ethical provisions is also a
strength of the recommendations' approach. While attorneys and cli-
ents alike appreciate the need for ethical standards, such provisions
should be sufficiently fluid to accommodate the evolving economies
and realities of law practice. The recommendations' approach is to
identify the purpose behind the applicable provisions, and then to
seek a less rigid mechanism to achieve those goals. As is demon-
strated in the analysis of "brief, specific advice" and of conflicts of
interest, this approach appears to work.
Although the recommendations help conceptualize how the ethical
provisions apply in the limited legal assistance context, distinguishing
between those services that qualify as "brief, specific advice" and
those requiring a diagnostic interview remains difficult. In the Group
discussions, we readily agreed that some services could be categorized
as "general advice," while others required the application of law to
client-specific scenarios, and still others required a more in-depth fac-
tual analysis.'43 Agreeing upon what fact scenarios fit in which cate-
gory was more challenging. Through ongoing evaluation and
experimentation, these two categories of assistance can be more care-
fully defined.
A second notable weakness in the recommendations is a failure to
consider a "likelihood of success" standard in evaluating limited legal
assistance delivery methods."' Although the Group acknowledged
the absence of data on the success of limited legal assistance delivery
models, we eagerly sought an analysis that would permit the use of
such methodologies, allow adequate protection for clients, and be
workable for the profession. While this approach has merit, more
data is needed.'45 It is imperative that assessment begin immediately,
142. Id Recommendation 60, at 1776-77.
143. See Working Group Report, supra note 45, at 1823. Actually, the term "brief,
specific advice" was not used during our discussions. In carefully reviewing the rec-
ommendations following the conference, however, it became apparent that we
needed a term to describe those limited, but case-specific, advice settings.
144. For further discussion of the factors involved in a "likelihood of success" anal-
ysis, see supra Part III.
145. While acknowledging the need for thorough assessment of delivery models,
the Group did not suggest that assessment be a prerequisite for ongoing experimenta-
tion or funding.
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be implemented in ongoing programs, and be carefully conducted to
generate concrete data on a range of issues.
The Fordham Conference's recommendations on limited legal
assistance represent a dramatic effort to address the needs of low-in-
come clients through evolving delivery mechanisms while maintaining
high ethical and professional standards. These preliminary comments
evaluate how these recommendations work in practice, highlighting
their strengths and weaknesses. They also demonstrate the critical
need to assess the effectiveness of limited legal assistance. If these
recommendations are adopted by the profession, their impact in as-
sisting clients in obtaining greater access to justice, and on the judicial
system and the profession, is uncertain. The potential is profound.
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APPENDIX
Although the Working Group on Limited Legal Assistance gener-
ally believes that amendments to the Model Rules are unnecessary
and that a new "gloss" on the Rules is sufficient to accommodate
these recommendations, the participants did not have sufficient time
to actually engage in a thoughtful analysis of how each recommenda-
tion dovetails with the Model Rules. In light of this brief analysis of
the limited legal assistance recommendations, the following tentative
revisions to the Model Rules are proposed for study and
consideration:
A. Preamble
The following provisions from the recommendations on Limited
Legal Assistance should be added to the Preamble:
a. Access to justice must be maximized by an ongoing analysis of
the purpose of law and legal proceedings and the implementation of
modifications that simplify the administration of justice and serve the
interests of the public without undue intervention.
b. The legal profession has a responsibility to facilitate access to
justice; therefore, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct should be
interpreted to encourage use and expansion of responsible modes of
representation that increase such access.
c. Rules regarding the administration of justice, rules governing the
practice of law, and rules prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law
should not be created, advanced, interpreted, or applied so as to ob-
struct efforts to increase access.
d. The courts and the legal profession should be encouraged to ex-
plore innovative efforts and to assist pro se litigants.
B. Model Rule 1.1.
This rule provides that "a lawyer shall provide competent represen-
tation to a client." However, "representation" is not defined. The
comments and other authority assume traditional, full service repre-
sentation. A comment should be added to Model Rule 1.1 specifying
that "representation" may include "advice only" and other forms of
discrete task representation.
C. Model Rule 1.3.
This rule provides that "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client." Comment 3 further pro-
vides that "[u]nless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule
1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters under-
taken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific
matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been re-
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solved." This comment should be modified to permit the situation ad-
dressed in the recommendations in the "brief, specific advice
category," providing that in certain circumstances, "the lawyer or legal
services program has no duty to provide complete assistance with re-
spect to the individual's legal problem."
D. Model Rule 1.7.
The conflicts of interest provisions should be modified to permit a
looser interpretation in the "brief, specific advice" context. The com-
ments should provide that the primary concerns are protecting client
confidences and avoiding divided loyalties; if those two concerns are
addressed, a more lenient application of the conflicts of interest prin-
ciples should be permitted in limited legal assistance settings.
E. New Rule on Prospective Clients.
A new rule should be drafted on prospective clients, as has been
proposed by ABA Ethics 2000. It should address issues such as confi-
dentiality, conflicts of interest, and the competence standard in the
context of prospective clients.
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